Security
safe-chains is an allowlist-only command checker. It auto-approves bash commands that it can verify as safe. Any command not explicitly recognized is left for the human to approve.
What it prevents
Auto-approval of destructive, write, or state-changing commands. An agentic tool cannot use safe-chains to bypass permission prompts for rm, git push, sed -i, curl -X POST, or any command/flag combination not in the allowlist.
Security properties
Allowlist-only. Unrecognized commands are never approved.
Per-segment validation. Commands with shell operators (&&, |, ;, &) are split into segments. Each segment must independently pass validation. One safe segment cannot cause another to be approved.
Redirection handling. Output redirection (>, >>) to /dev/null is inert. Output redirection to any other file is allowed at safe-write level. Input redirection (<), here-strings (<<<), and here-documents (<<, <<-) are allowed.
Substitution validation. Command substitutions ($(...)) are extracted and recursively validated. echo $(git log) is approved because git log is safe. echo $(rm -rf /) is not. bash -c and sh -c recursively validate their arguments.
No shell evaluation. eval, exec, source, and . (dot-source) are never approved when they would execute arbitrary commands.
Settings guardrails. When matching commands against your Claude Code settings patterns, segments containing >, <, backticks, or $() are never approved via settings, even if a pattern matches. This prevents Bash(./script *) from approving ./script > /etc/passwd.
What it does not prevent
- Information disclosure. Read-only commands can read sensitive files (
cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa). Sensitive contents would be read by the model provider. We recommend pairing safe-chains with a hook to block reading~/.ssh,../credentialsand similar directories. - Unrecognized commands. Commands safe-chains doesn’t handle are passed through to the normal permission flow, not blocked.
- Broad user-approved patterns. If you add patterns like
Bash(bash *)to your Claude Code settings, safe-chains will match them per-segment without recursive validation, matching Claude Code’s own behavior. See Cleaning up approved commands.
What safe-chains is not
- Not a sandbox. It does not restrict what commands can do once they run. It only decides whether to auto-approve the permission prompt.
- Not a firewall. While unsafe commands are not approved, it does not filter at the network layer or file system operations layer.
- Not an inspection tool. It evaluates based on path, args and flags, not binary signatures.
Testing approach
Every command handler is covered by multiple layers of automated testing:
- Unknown flag rejection. Every command is automatically tested to verify it rejects unknown flags and subcommands.
- Property verification. Systematic tests verify that
help_eligibledeclarations match actual behavior, thatbare=falsepolicies reject bare invocations, that guarded subcommands require their guard flags, and that nested subcommands reject bare parent invocations. - Per-handler tests. Each handler includes explicit safe/denied test cases covering expected approvals and rejections.
- Registry completeness. A test verifies that every command in the handled set has a corresponding entry in the test registry, and vice versa.
Reporting vulnerabilities
If you find a command that safe-chains approves but shouldn’t, please open an issue.
Contributing
Found a safe command safe-chains should support? Submit an issue.